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Abstract—We propose a robust—to new dataset and
situation—approach to detect violence in CCTV feeds that
breaks with the traditional assumption of having large amounts
of training data that are representative samples. Detecting
violence in CCTV feeds is an objectively hard problem that
is of paramount importance to solve for effective situational
understanding. Violence comprises a large spectrum of activities
that can go from abuse, to fighting, to road accidents, that can
therefore take place in completely different environments, from
public buildings, to underground stations, to roads during the
day or the night. This is therefore one of those tasks at which
humans excel, while machines still lag behind. We show that
there are specific, detectable, and measurable features of video
feeds that correlate with—among other things—violence and,
by fusing such features with semantic knowledge, we can in
principle provide estimates of sequences of videos that correlate
with violence.
Index Terms—uncertain sources, complex event processing
I. INTRODUCTION
Detecting violence in CCTV feeds is an objectively hard
problem that is of paramount importance to solve for effective
situational understanding. Situational understanding requires
both insight and foresight. In its traditional definition [1] it is
the “product of applying analysis and judgement to the unit’s
situation awareness to determine the relationships of the fac-
tors present, and form logical conclusions concerning threats
to the mission accomplishment, opportunities for mission ac-
complishment, and gaps in information.” The UK Ministry of
Defence Doctrine [2] goes further, explicitly mentioning that
(situational) “understanding involves acquiring and developing
knowledge to a level that enables us to know why something
has happened or is happening (insight) and be able to identify
and anticipate what may happen (foresight).”
Violence, in particular, comprises a large spectrum of activ-
ities that can go from abuse, to fighting, to road accidents, that
can therefore take place in completely different environments,
from public buildings, to underground stations, to roads during
the day or the night. This is therefore one of those tasks at
which humans excel, while machines still lag behind.
It is therefore surprising that state-of-the-art approaches
[3] assume—as is traditional—the existence of a large set
This research was sponsored by the U.S. Army Research Laboratory and
the U.K. Ministry of Defence under Agreement Number W911NF-16-3-0001.
The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the
authors and should not be interpreted as representing the official policies,
either expressed or implied, of the U.S. Army Research Laboratory, the U.S.
Government, the U.K. Ministry of Defence or the U.K. Government. The U.S.
and U.K. Governments are authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for
Government purposes notwithstanding any copyright notation hereon.
of training data that is representative of the domain. Such
machine learning techniques can only interpolate from the
data that trained them: they cannot extrapolate knowledge
about a test sample that is far different than the training data
[4]. Such a traditional approach is not sustainable: a novel,
robust approach to learning and reasoning must be developed.
Robustness (Section II) against new dataset and situations
depends on specific and measurable attributes of violence:
our assumptions are that (1) rapid movements correlate with
acts of violence; and (2) acts of violence—involving human
activities—last more than fractions of a second. If such hy-
potheses are satisfied, a solution can be envisaged by fusing
simple events detected in a few frames, together with semantic
knowledge of the scenes obtained via object detection. Both
detectors are not expected to be trained on datasets that include
violence, thus breaking with the traditional approach. We rely
on Complex Event Processing (CEP) [5], [6] as a method
to fuse symbolic and sub-symbolic pieces of information.
CEP is a mature technique used for processing and analysing
streams of data from multiple sources to detect complex event
patterns that suggest complicated situations. In particular, we
will rely on CEP via event calculus over probabilistic logic
programming [7] (cf. Section III-C).
We found evidence (Section IV) in favour of our hypotheses
when using UCF-Crime [3], a state-of-the-art dataset on crime
and violent activities. We also found evidence that even one of
the simplest definitions of complex event—two simple events
in a row—together with basic background knowledge—e.g.,
abusing a person requires having at least two people in the
frame—helps detect scenes of violence in our pilot study
(Section V). This is a significant milestone in our ongoing
research aimed at providing robust methodologies to detect
violence in CCTV video feeds, and in Section VI we discuss
our next steps.
II. CCTV ANALYTIC NEEDS TO BE ROBUST
The problem of detecting violence in CCTV footage is a
special case of the anomaly detection problem, one of the most
challenging and long standing problems in many domains,
from cybersecurity [8] to video analytics in general [9]–[17],
[17]–[20]. In [9], [20] the authors used deep learning based
autoencoders to learn the model of normal behaviours: this is
clearly one of the preferred ways to address the problem, under
the assumption that normality can be defined with sufficient
accuracy in a given domain.
When it comes to detecting violence or aggression in videos,
approaches comprise the use of (1) models of motions and
limbs orientation of people [21]; (2) multi-modality learning
[22]; and (3) behaviour heuristics [23]. Due to successful
demonstration of deep learning for image classification, sev-
eral approaches have been proposed for video action classifi-
cation [24], [25].
However, obtaining annotations for training is difficult
and laborious, especially for videos. To our knowledge, [3],
demonstrated on UCF-Crime, is currently the state-of-the-art
in this domain. UCF-Crime [3] is a dataset comprised of
950 clips taken from CCTV footage, each clip categorised
as one of 13 classes of abnormal behaviour, such as abuse—
to be interpreted as cruel and violent treatment of a person
or animal1—, arrest, arson, assault, burglary, explosion, fight-
ing, road accidents, robbery, shooting, shoplifting, stealing,
and vandalism. UCF-Crime is also complemented with 950
normal videos where no such activities take place: the original
intention was to create a larger dataset for anomaly detection.
In [3] the authors provide temporal labels for 140 videos
to train an anomaly detector using multiple instance learning
(MIL) [26], [27] achieving an overall AUC of 75.41. The
authors treat normal and anomalous surveillance videos as
bags and short segments/clips of each video as instances in
a bag. Based on training videos, they automatically learn an
anomaly ranking model that predicts high anomaly scores
for anomalous segments in a video. During testing, a long,
untrimmed video is divided into segments and fed into their
deep network which assigns anomaly score for each video
segment such that an anomaly can be detected.
A. Robustness Assurance: Working Assumptions/Hypotheses
Differently from most of the literature in machine learning
and computer vision, we cannot commit to the assumption
that it is possible to collect representative samples of anomaly
situations we wish to detect. In [4] we discuss cases, such as
controlling the crowd during a peace-keeping mission before
riots will happen, that are extremely rare and unpredictable,
thus posing a real challenge for sample data acquisition.
Our working assumption is like having a blind soft-
ware agent, Sandy, parachuted into uncharted territory. What
Sandy roughly knows is types of violent situations they
will witness—let us say violence between humans—and they
possess (1) sensors informing them whether what we will
name simple events of unknown types happen in a short,
fixed—but unknown—timeframe (typically 0.5 seconds) and
their probability; and (2) sensors informing them of the pres-
ence of humans, animals, and certain objects with associated
probability. Sandy’s mission is to develop heuristics to guess
whether they witness a situation or not. We therefore assume
Sandy can leverage:
(a) a system able to detect simple events in very short video
segments, trained on datasets unrelated to those Sandy
will witness;
1https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/abuse (on 8th March 2019).
(b) a system able to detect humans, objects, and animals in
images, once again trained on datasets unrelated to those
Sandy will witness;
(c) a system for fusing information coming from the above
two systems, and exogenous pieces of information.
Section III discusses in detail the three systems we chose for
this investigation. To ensure Sandy can reasonably perform its
duty, we prove the following two hypotheses considering the
state-of-the-art dataset UCF-Crime:
Hypothesis 1: there is a relationship between the number of
simple events taking place in each video of UCF-Crime
and the type of violent situation present in it;
Hypothesis 2: there is a relationship between the number of
simple events taking place in each video of UCF-Crime
and the number of pre-defined combinations of simple
events taking place in the same video, e.g., the number of
cases where two simple events took place consecutively.
B. An Example from the UCF-Crime Dataset
Figure 1 depicts four frames of the video Abuse001,
an instance of abuse. It is a portion of surveillance video
recording the north vestibule of St Cecilia cathedral in Omaha,
Nebraska, USA, where on 18th August 2015 CE, at about
11:06 am, a man struck a 76-year-old woman after another
man stole her purse.2 While it is known that Abuse001
contains element of abuse, only when looking at the video
does it become apparent that the act of violence begins in
frame 258 (Fig. 1b), when the first man steals the woman’s
purse, and then it continues in frame 300 (Fig. 1c), when the
second man strikes the woman. The woman then falls to the
ground where she will remain from frame 380 (Fig. 1d) until
frame 765.3 Therefore, only about 16% of these frames contain
genuine abusive activity: cf. [3, Figure 5] for statistics on the
whole testing set.
III. PROXY MODELS AND HOW TO FUSE THEM
Our software agent can leverage the following three sys-
tems.
A. System (a): Kinetics
Our software agent is expected to be able to leverage
a system able to detect simple events in very short video
segments, trained on datasets unrelated to those it will witness.
To this aim, in this analysis we consider Kinetics-400, a large-
scale labelled dataset of various human-focused actions. The
dataset is composed of approximately 300,000 YouTube video
URLs containing examples of mostly human action [28]. The
labelling for each video is decided automatically by inferring
2Edited video is available on the Youtube channel of KETV NewsWatch 7—
a local TV station—at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uswCrbMymvE
(on 8th March 2019); the news story was reported also by the Omaha
World Herald—a local newspaper—at https://www.omaha.com/news/
crime/video--year-old-woman-attacked-at-st-cecilia-cathedral/article
c60f4dcc-45de-11e5-bd6c-53122e3ec616.html.
3In Abuse001 these 765 frames are repeated 3 more times, with the last
repetition interrupting at the moment the two men enter the church, for a total
of 2,727 frames.
(a) Frame 1 (b) Frame 258 (c) Frame 300 (d) Frame 380
Fig. 1: Frames of Abuse001 video related to the aggression of a woman in Omaha, Nebraska, USA. Original size: 320x240px
RGB, including black bars (28px left and right, 30px top and bottom) removed here thus reducing images to 264x180px.
the activity from the title of the video, given by the uploader.
Kinetics has come to be used as an analogue to ImageNet, as
was the intent of the dataset’s authors, useful in pre-training
models for smaller datasets or more specific tasks. Following
[29], we use a 3D ResNet with 34 convolutional layers pre-
trained on Kinetics.
B. System (b): COCO
Our software agent also needs to leverage a system able
to detect humans, objects, and animals in images, once again
trained on datasets unrelated to those it will witness. To this
end, we consider Mask R-CNN [30], a framework for object
instance segmentation. It is based on Faster R-CNN [31] and
is designed to output a class label, a bounding box, and an
object mask for each candidate object. Mask R-CNN consists
of two stages. The first stage is a Region Proposal Network,
which proposes potential object bounding boxes. In the second
stage, Mask R-CNN predicts the mask for the object in parallel
to predicting the class and the box offset. COCO [32] is
a large-scale dataset that can be used for object detection,
segmentation and captioning. The dataset contains 91 different
classes with 330,000 images of complex everyday situations.
An implementation of Mask R-CNN has been made available
[33], which includes pre-trained weights for COCO.
C. System (c): CEP with Probabilistic Logic Programming
Finally, our software agent needs to leverage a system for
fusing information coming from the above two systems, and
exogenous pieces of information. To this end, CEP aims at
identifying complex events from a stream of simpler events,
which tend to be records of short or instantaneous activities in
a the stream of data. Complex events instead are longer and
are composed by a sequence of simple events. There are many
different approaches to find which complex events can be
extracted from which lower-level events. Here we will focus on
an approach [7] using probabilistic logic programming (PLP).
Probabilistic Logic Programming: ProbLog [34], [35]4
belongs to a family of PLP languages [36] following Sato’s
distribution semantics [37]. It extends logic programming by
annotating some ground facts with their probability of being
true, which generalizes a single program into a distribu-
tion over programs that share their rules, but differ in their
4https://dtai.cs.kuleuven.be/problog/.
databases. More specifically, a ProbLog program consists of
two parts, a set F of ground probabilistic facts p::f where
p is a probability and f a ground atom, and a set R of rules
h :- b1,...,bn where h is a logical atom and the bi are
literals.5 While the semantics is defined for countably-infinite
sets of probabilistic facts [37], we restrict the discussion
to the finite case in the following. ProbLog considers the
ground probabilistic facts as independent random variables,
i.e., we obtain the following probability distribution PF over
truth value assignments to sets of ground facts F ′ ⊆ F :
PF (F
′) =
∏
fi∈F ′ pi ·
∏
fi∈F\F ′(1− pi).
As each logic program obtained by choosing a truth value
for every probabilistic fact has a unique least Herbrand model,
PF can be used to define the success probability P (q) of a
query q, that is, the probability that q is true in a randomly
chosen such program, as the sum over all programs that
entail q: P (q) :=
∑
F ′⊆F
∃θF ′∪R|=qθ
PF (F
′) =
∑
F ′⊆F
∃θF ′∪R|=qθ
∏
fi∈F ′ pi ·∏
fi∈F\F ′(1− pi).
Inference in ProbLog is concerned with computing marginal
probabilities of queries, i.e., ground atoms, under this distri-
bution, potentially conditioned on a conjunction of evidence
atoms. While this is a #P-hard problem in general, ProbLog
relies on state-of-the-art knowledge compilation techniques to
achieve scalable inference across a wide range of models.
Event Calculus in ProbLog: ProbEC [7] is an approach
to complex event recognition that tries to adapt event calculus
to handle uncertainty in event recognition. It is based on the
idea from event calculus that there are variables, called fluents,
that can assume different values at different points in time. For
example, if F is a fluent it is possible to express F = V , which
denotes that F has value V (at a specific point in time).We
can determinate that F = V holds for a particular point in
time if it has been initiated at a previous point and it has not
been terminated since. A fluent can be initiated and terminated
multiple times in a row with the same value. In event calculus,
the first initialisation and termination are the ones that change
the state of the fluent. ProbEC assigns the statement F = V
with a probability that increases every time F = V is initiated
5For the semantics of ProbLog to be well-defined, the set of rules has to
have a two-valued well-founded model for each subset of the probabilistic
facts: a sufficient condition for this is for programs to be stratified, i.e., have
no loops through negation [35], [36].
and decreases every time it is terminated. The amount by
which this value increases or decreases is proportional to the
confidence we have on the fact that F = V is initiated or
terminated.
ProbEC is implemented in ProbLog:6 (Listing 1). Lines 1–8
in Listing 1 check if a fluent has a certain value at a certain
point on time. The fluent F represents the event. If we want
to represent that the event is happening we will use the value
V of true. Otherwise, we will use the value of false. In
order to check if it holds that the fluent has a certain value
it checks if the broken clauses are false. Defined in lines 10–
19, those clauses will be true if the assignment of the value
we are asking about has finished, either because it has been
terminated or because it has been assigned a different value.
Without the need to modify any of this code, the user can then
define when the events they are interested in are initialised or
terminated with the clauses initiatedAt and terminatedAt
respectively. This can be done with whichever conditions the
user seems appropriate for the event they are trying to detect.
1 h o l d s A t ( F = V, T ) :−
2 i n i t i a l l y ( F = V) ,
3 n o t b roken ( F = V, 0 , T ) .
4
5 h o l d s A t ( F = V, T ) :−
6 i n i t i a t e d A t ( F = V, Tprev ) ,
7 Tprev < T ,
8 n o t b roken ( F = V, Tprev , T ) .
9
10 broken ( F = V, Ti , Tf ) :−
11 t e r m i n a t e d A t ( F = V, Tm) ,
12 Ti < Tm,
13 Tm < Tf .
14
15 broken ( F = V1 , Ti , Tf ) :−
16 i n i t i a t e d A t ( F = V2 , Tm) ,
17 V1 \== V2
18 Ti < Tm,
19 Tm < Tf .
Listing 1: ProbEC [7] implementation in ProbLog.
IV. TESTING OUR HYPOTHESES
Figure 2 illustrates the pipeline we developed for analysing
the UCF-Crime dataset. Each video is segmented in overlap-
ping windows of 16 frames each, i.e. 〈s0, s8, s16, . . .〉.7 Each
segment si is then analysed by a model trained on Kinetics-
400, returning the Kinetics-400 class (henceforth named sim-
ple event) with highest probability from the softmax layer if
above a threshold µ = 0.085 (empirically determined), or the
special class χ (representing the absence of information) with
probability 1 − pi where pi the highest probability identified
by the softmax layer. Each segment si is also passed to a
model trained on COCO that identifies objects in each of the
16 frames. This serves as input to a function f¯ that returns
(1) the probability of having at least N objects of the same
6We changed the original code to adapt it to the current ProbLog2
architecture.
7Videos were padded to contain a number of frames multiple of 8.
Class λli λ̂li Num Frames
E SD E SD E SD
Abuse 93.6 1.4 25.3 0.7 483.2 579.3
Arrest 148.9 1.7 40.9 0.9 742.9 1127.0
Arson 119.1 1.5 26.7 0.7 679.2 2179.5
Assault 72.1 1.2 20.9 0.6 324.3 358.0
Burglary 72.0 0.8 17.0 0.4 588.5 843.4
Explosion 105.3 1.5 21.1 0.6 630.5 2463.1
Fighting 164.5 1.8 50.0 1.0 646.7 724.1
RoadAccidents 36.1 0.5 8.6 0.2 216.8 267.1
Robbery 68.0 0.7 17.9 0.3 351.6 313.3
Shooting 66.9 1.2 17.1 0.6 368.2 441.5
Shoplifting 145.2 1.7 35.4 0.8 810.4 1309.5
Stealing 69.2 0.8 14.4 0.4 583.7 551.2
Vandalism 61.8 1.1 15.4 0.6 367.4 332.8
TABLE I: Expected value (E) and standard deviation (SD) of
λli , λ̂li , and number of frames in videos (mean and standard
deviation of the sample) for each of the 13 li in UCF-Crime,
in alphabetical order.
class in the segment si; and (2) the probability of having two
objects close to each other within a segment.
Let v be the list of all the videos in UCF-Crime, such
that v = v l1 || . . . ||v l13 , where li is any of the 13 labels of the
dataset, and || represents vector concatenation. For a video vlix ,
let φlix = |{〈i, ξ〉 | ∃avxi = 〈i, pi, ξ〉, ξ 6= χ}|, i.e., the number
of simple events detected by the model trained on Kinetics-400
in the video vlix . Given a label li, let φ
li = 〈φli1 , . . . , φ|v
li |
1 〉
be the vector listing the occurrences of simple events between
the videos with weak label li (cf. Section II-A).
Let Φli be the number of occurrences of simple events in
videos weakly labelled li, Φli ∼ Poisson(λi). Let us assume
as prior Λli ∼ Gamma(αli , βli), with αli = βli =  arbitrary
small constant (in the following  = 10−100). Hence,
Λli | Φli ∼ Gamma
αli + |v
li |∑
j=1
φlij , βli + |v li |
 (1)
With this analysis, we are in the position to discuss the first
of the two hypothesis we list in Section II-A,
A. Hypothesis 1: Correlation between Number of Simple
Events and Weak Label
Figure 3a and Table I evidence that there is a correlation
between the number of simple events in videos and their
weak labels. Figure 3a depicts the Gamma distributions of the
various λli for each of the 13 weak labels li in UCF-Crime.
Expected values and standard deviation are also provided
in Table I, where the rather constrained values for standard
deviations strengthen the validity of our analysis reinforcing
the assumption of homogeneity, viz. that the number of simple
events in videos with the same weak label li is homogeneous
across all the videos. Such a correlation does not seem to
depend on the length of the videos in the dataset, cf. Table I.
While such a correlation exists, it is not necessarily unique.
From visual inspection of Figure 3a it is evident that there
t0 16
8
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Fig. 2: Data processing pipeline for UCF-Crime.
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Fig. 3: Gamma distributions of λli (a), and of λ̂li (b) for each weak label li of UCF-Crime. Labels in each legend sorted by
expected values.
are seven classes of videos that can be uniquely identified,
namely RoadAccidents, Explosion, Vandalism, Abuse, Shoplift-
ing, Arrest, and Fighting. The distributions for the remaining
six classes—Shooting, Arson, Robbery, Stealing, Assault, and
Burglary—are instead substantially overlapping. As discussed
in Section VI, we will further investigate these cases by
considering the (temporal) distribution of the 400 types of
simple events within videos with such weak labels.
B. Hypothesis 2: Correlation between Number of Simple
Events and Number of Combination of Simple Events
For a video vlix , let φ̂
li
x = |{〈i, ξ〉 | ∃avxi =
〈i, pi, ξ〉 and ∃avxi = 〈i − 8, pi−8, ξ′〉, ξ, ξ′ 6= χ}|, i.e., the
number of occurrences of detecting two simple events con-
sequently via the model trained on Kinetics-400 in the video
vlix . Given a label li, let φ̂
li
= 〈φ̂li1 , . . . , φ̂|v
li |
1 〉 be the vector
listing the occurrences of simple events between the videos
with weak label li. Then, let Φ̂li be the number of occurrences
of two consequent simple events in videos weakly labelled li:
Φ̂li ∼ Poisson(λ̂i). From (1), we then have:
Λ̂li | Φ̂li ∼ Gamma
αli + |v
li |∑
j=1
φ̂lij , βli + |v li |
 (2)
Figure 3b depicts the Gamma distributions of the various
λ̂li for each of the 13 weak labels li of UCF-Crime: expected
values and standard deviation are also provided in Table I.
The relationship that emerges between Figure 3a and Figure
3b (similarly between λli and λ̂li in Table I) evidences that
there is a correlation between the number of simple events
in videos and the number of consecutive occurrences of two
simple events in the same video. In particular, the sampled
ratio E[Λli |Φ
li ]
E[Λ̂li |Φ̂li ]
has E=4.04 and SD=0.48. Classes with a ratio
outside one σ are: Assault: 3.45; Explosion: 4.99; Fighting:
3.29; and Stealing: 4.80.
In the following we will investigate specific cases belonging
to the classes RoadAccidents and Fighting that manifest the
lowest and highest λli and λ̂li respectively; as well as cases
of the class Abuse that is average w.r.t. λli .
V. FOUR CASE STUDIES
The four case studies we manually chose are:
RoadAccidents002. The video shows a street—with a few
cars and bus moving—and the sidewalk with about 15
persons walking. After 7 seconds, a bus enters the scene
and almost immediately runs into a sign, a lamp post,
and a street advertising board (1 in Fig. 4a).
RoadAccidents110. The camera looks at a wide sidewalk
showing open air market stalls and about 10 people
walking (1 in Fig. 4b), with a road in the background.
After about 4 seconds a blue truck driving in the inner
lane of the road enters the scene (2 in Fig. 4b), followed
one second later by a white truck. Another second later
this second truck drives out of the street into the sidewalk,
where it runs over a pedestrian (3 in Fig. 4b). The truck
then falls to its side (4 in Fig. 4b).
Abuse001. This is the video described at length in Section
II-B, cf. also Figure 1, about a woman robbed and
punched to the floor by two men (1 in Fig. 4c) who then
tried to stand up (2 in Fig. 4c).
Abuse007. This video starts with two teenagers and what
appears to be a guard walking in a hallway. About 3
seconds into the video, the guard punches one of the
teenagers in the face (1 in Fig. 4d), which causes him
to fall to the floor. In the following, the characters move
around the hallway (2, 3, 4, and 5 in Fig. 4d) but no
further violence happens.
Fighting003. The video starts with a view of an underground
station with about 10 people waiting. As the video goes
on some other people come into frame (1 in Fig. 4e).
After about one minute, the 15 people in the frame start
a fight which leads some of them to run across the station
(2 in Fig. 4f).
Fighting018 The video is clearly edited, as it begins with
a title section stating “Teen girl using real karate. Self
defence to beat a robber.” In an underpass a man attempts
to rob a girl, who then stops the robber, fights with him,
knock him down (1 in Fig. 4f), and then runs away (2
in Fig. 4f). Other people walk pasts the robber on the
floor (3, 4, 5 in Fig. 4f) until the video terminates with
an animated closing section (6 in Fig. 4f).
A. Anomaly as Complex Event
Systems (a) and (b) (cf. Figure 2) analyse each video and
produce as output a file listing whether something or not
happened in a specific 16-frames window, as well as semantic
information such as the presence of people or animals, and
how close they are in the picture. Each information is aug-
mented with its associated probability (cf. Listing 2).
1 0 . 1 9 3 3 : : happensAt ( someth ing , 0 ) .
2 0 . 9 6 1 7 : : happensAt ( n o t h i n g , 8 ) .
3 0 . 3 8 0 8 : : happensAt ( a t L e a s t ( 1 , p e r s o n ) , 8 ) .
4 0 . 9 2 4 9 : : happensAt ( c l o s e ( per son , dog ) , 8 ) .
Listing 2: Example of input to System (c)
Receiving this as input, System (c) can now exploit the
relationship we show in Section II-A between λli and λ̂li
(Hypothesis 2), namely to define an anomaly as a complex
event each time there are two consecutive simple events.
Listings 3 and 4 show our implementation of such a definition
using the ProbEC approach (Section III).
1 i n i t i a t e d A t ( v ideoOnly = t r u e , T ) :−
2 happensAt ( someth ing , T ) ,
3 Tnext i s T + 8 ,
4 happensAt ( someth ing , Tnext ) .
5
6 i n i t i a t e d A t ( v ideoOnly = f a l s e , T ) :−
7 happensAt ( n o t h i n g , T ) ,
8 Tprev i s T − 8 ,
9 happensAt ( n o t h i n g , Tprev ) .
Listing 3: Anomaly detection on UCF-Crime with ProbEC
and data from System (a) only.
In Listing 3, lines 1 to 10 identifies boundaries of complex
events on the basis of System (a) only. More specifically, lines
2 to 5 control the initialisation of the events and lines 7 to 10
control the termination. The initialisation checks that an event
happens at the given frame (line 3) and then 8 frames later
(lines 4 and 5), cf. Figure 2. Similarly for the termination of
the complex event.
1 i n i t i a t e d A t ( v ideoObjDe t = t r u e , T ) :−
2 i n i t i a t e d A t ( v ideoOnly = t r u e , T ) ,
3 happensAt ( a t L e a s t ( 2 , p e r s o n ) , T ) ,
4 happensAt ( c l o s e ( per son , p e r s o n ) , T ) .
5
6 i n i t i a t e d A t ( v ideoObjDe t = t r u e , T ) :−
7 i n i t i a t e d A t ( v ideoOnly = t r u e , T ) ,
8 happensAt ( a t L e a s t ( 1 , p e r s o n ) , T ) ,
9 i s A n i m a l (A) ,
10 happensAt ( a t L e a s t ( 1 , A) , T ) ,
11 happensAt ( c l o s e ( per son , A) , T ) .
12
13 i n i t i a t e d A t ( v ideoObjDe t = f a l s e , T ) :−
14 i n i t i a t e d A t ( v ideoOnly = f a l s e , T ) .
15
16 i s A n i m a l ( dog ) .
Listing 4: Anomaly detection on UCF-Crime with ProbEC,
fusing data from System (a) and System (b).
Data from System (b) is then fused together with data from
System (a) in rules that begin respectively at line 1 and at
line 6 of Listing 4. The first one (lines 1 to 4) says that there
must be at least 2 persons in the frame (line 3). Then, it also
says that two persons have to be close (line 4). Alternatively,
the second one (lines 6 to 11) considers the cases where an
animal is involved and it expects the animal to be close to a
person (line 11). Line 16 shows an example on how to include
an arbitrary long list of animals that System (b) can detect.
B. Empirical results
Figures 4(a–f) show the results of applying each of the two
methods (cf. Listings 3 and 4) on the six selected videos. For
each frame (X-axis), it is represented the probability that it is
associated to an anomaly (complex event). Such probabilities
appears small at first sight: this results from considering
anything that the softmax layer of System (a) provides with
probability greater than µ = 0.085. For the purposes of this
paper anything greater than 0 should be considered as a frame
in which the System (c) detects anomaly.
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Fig. 4: Results for the six videos: RoadAccidents002 (a) and RoadAccidents110 (b) are instances of RoadAccidents;
Abuse001 (c) and Abuse007 (d) are instances of Abuse; Fighting003 (e) and Fighting018 (f) are instances of Fighting. In
grey the ground truth for the act of violence. In blue (Video only) results using only events detected by System (a) (Listing
3); in orange (Video + Object Detection) results obtained by fusing input from both System (a) and System (b) (Listing 4).
From visual inspection, it appears that there is correlation
between the frames belonging to detected anomalies and the
ground truth regarding violent actions. Violent actions are
composed—if not identified—by anomalous complex events
as detected by System (c) in five out of six of the videos
that compose this pilot study. It is also worth noticing that
fusing almost trivial background knowledge—cf. Listing 4—
help filter out some false positives. For instance, in the case of
Abuse001 (cf. Figure 1 and Section II-B), System (c) using
only information coming from System (a) would identify two
complex events (Figure 4c), one starting around frame 210—
when the woman is attacked—and one starting around frame
620—when the woman tries to stand up. However, this second
complex event is not considered when fusing with information
coming from System (b) (cf. Listing 4), with the simple rule
that for having an act of abuse on a person, at least two people
need to be in the frame. From frame 620 onward only the
woman is in the frame, hence it cannot be the case that there
is an act of abuse happening (cf. orange line in Fig. 4c). The
same can be said for the rule that the two people have to be
close to each other. For example, in Abuse007, some of the
false positives are removed thanks to this rule, despite the fact
that there are always at least two people in the frame.
This pilot study shows that analysing combinations of
simple events detected by System (a), fused with knowledge
gathered by System (b) and by human expertise, can in
principle help addressing the problem of identifying violence
in real videos using proxy models. However, our pilot study
also shows that there are clear limitations. Figure 4b depicts
the results of System (c) on RoadAccidents110: the actual
act of violence is completely missed. However, a different
definition of complex event—notably at least two simple
events detected by System (a) within any window of 16 frames
(instead of the current 8)—would address it. Moreover, as also
expected from the analysis of Section II-A, fights—cf. Figures
4e and 4f—will be more complicated to be analysed within our
framework. However, multiple approaches that we believe can
improve the performance will be considered in future work.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We present the results of a pilot study investigating the
effectiveness of a novel, robust approach to learning and
reasoning for detecting violence in CCTV streams. We found
evidence (Section IV) in favour of the generality of our
approach when using UCF-Crime [3], a current state-of-the-
art dataset on crime and violence. We also found evidence that
adopting the simplest fusion mechanism of actions detected
by a 3D ResNet and knowledge obtained by object detection,
helps detect scenes of violence in our pilot study (Section V).
In future work we will move away from the standard 3D
ResNet architecture in favour of an Evidential Deep Learning
(EDL) architecture. EDL aims at extending classical deep
learning with ideas from evidential reasoning [38] to quantify
uncertainty in classification tasks [39]. For a sample, EDL tries
to learn parameters of a predictive posterior as a Dirichlet
density function for the classification of the sample. This
is done by replacing the softmax layer in a classical deep
classifier with an activation function that produces only non-
negative outputs (e.g., relu, softplus, etc). The resulting output
is considered as the evidence for the classification of the
sample over n class labels. From the calculated evidence,
parameters of the corresponding Dirichlet density is calculated.
In this way we will be able to provide a threshold µ in a
principled manner.
Secondly, we will take into consideration also the classes
identified by the 3D architecture we will be using. In this pilot
study we just distinguished between whether an action was
detected or not (according to the µ parameter). An analysis
in the sequence of actions detected and their correlation with
violence activities is already envisaged.
Finally, we will investigate more articulated definitions of
complex events. As discussed in Section V-B, in the case
of RoadAccidents110 (cf. Figure 4b) the actual act of
violence is completely missed. However, a different definition
of complex event—notably at least two simple events detected
by System (a) within any window of 16 frames (instead of
the current 8)—would detect it. Striking a balance between
accuracy over the UCF-Crime without overfitting is one of
the major tasks for us in the foreseen future.
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